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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Paglieri has written us a welcome appreciation of the prospects and likely facts of 
argument escalation. As he observes, our community has an unconsciously optimistic 
point of view about argument processes. For the most part we expect properly conducted 
arguments to approach consensus or some sort of happy mutuality. When this does not 
happen, we are inclined to find fault, either with the arguers, their argument schemes, or 
the argumentation process. Paglieri helps us to understand that intelligent people 
operating with reasonable competence may nonetheless accomplish destructive 
escalation. Although we may be able to understand and predict this outcome, we may 
nonetheless find ourselves with no person, text, or process to blame. Escalation is not 
necessarily diagnostic of bad arguing or bad arguers: the encounter may simply have 
begun with awful prospects. 
 I find several aspects of Paglieri’s development to be unusually interesting, and so 
I will confine my remarks to those. In particular, I am impressed with his analysis of 
matters pertinent to argument engagement—that is, the decision whether to engage or 
not. This is an important and under-researched topic in argument studies. I consider that 
Paglieri has already explored escalation rather thoroughly, so I will confine myself to 
appreciating and projecting his thinking onto the topic of engagement. 
 
2. ARGUMENT ENGAGEMENT 
 
Paglieri treats two sets of ideas that each tell us something about whether or not a person 
will engage in argument. They do so from points of view that are distinguished in their 
abstractness. Paglieri treats these for their relevance to whether an argument will escalate, 
but they are also informative about the engagement decision. 
 The more abstract set of ideas is the first one, which Paglieri uses to develop some 
ideas that are theoretical on their face, and which may well be appreciated at some level 
by naïve actors. These include four factors: epistemological, cost/benefit, articulation, 
and socio-cultural. The epistemological factor refers to the chance that an argument will 
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escalate as the arguers begin to regard one another as not simply disagreeing, but as being 
blind to good reasons. The cost/benefits factor recognizes that as an argument proceeds it 
takes up more and more resources, so that a failure of agreement is more frustrating and 
costly at the end of the encounter than it was in the beginning. The articulation factor is 
somewhat similar to the epistemological one: here, the process of arguing exposes the 
arguers’ reasons and beliefs, leading to an explosion of subsidiary disagreements. Finally 
the socio-cultural factor refers to the social appropriateness of arguing at that time, in that 
place, on that topic, with that partner. 
 Paglieri offers these as potential sources for escalatory pressures. But since none 
of these are beyond the natural experience of arguers, we should entertain the idea that 
ordinary people are sensitive to these matters in some degree. I take as a base assumption 
the proposition that people will not voluntarily engage in an argument that is going to 
explode. There will be exceptions to this generalization: sometimes a person will want to 
incite, a particular situation may punish avoidance more than escalation, an arguer may 
have lost emotional control, or a person may simply be quite verbally aggressive. We will 
need to think differently about these sorts of circumstances and make allowance for them 
in our theorizing. Today, however, let us simply take as given the idea that when people 
have reason to anticipate escalation, they will not engage in arguing.  
 Given this assumption, Paglieri’s thinking offers us a number of testable 
hypotheses about argument avoidance. These need only be slightly revised from his more 
or less explicit hypotheses about which arguments will escalate. The engagement 
hypotheses following from his first set of ideas are these: 
 1. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the 
other person will not be reasonable.  
 2. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the 
costs of arguing will exceed the projected benefits from that particular interaction. 
 3. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they anticipate that the 
process of arguing will reveal more and more disagreements than were apparent at the 
point when the engagement decision needed to be made. 
 4. People are less likely to engage in an argument when arguing would be socially 
inappropriate. 
Conceptually, this is a small step—moving from the reasons for escalation, to the 
possibility that arguers can anticipate escalation, to predictions about whether they will 
engage.  
 Paglieri’s second set of ideas is more explicitly concerned with the engagement 
decision. He, too, shares the assumption that people will try to avoid escalatory episodes 
and seek out those more likely to generate agreement. Here we discover him proposing 
engagement hypotheses directly. His predictions are these (I have expressed them as 
being about avoidance): 
 5. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they feel their reasons are 
weaker than those of their cointeractant. 
 6. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they estimate that the 
other person’s disagreeing thought is so important to the other person that change in view 
is unlikely. 
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 7. People are less likely to engage in an argument when they consider the 
argument’s domain so complex that a completely satisfying exploration would be 
unacceptably costly in terms of resources. 
 8. People are less likely to engage in an argument when its topic or implications 
are sensitive to self, other, or relationship.  
 9. People are less likely to engage in an argument when social considerations 
strongly indicate that they should be agreeing and not disagreeing. 
 10. People are less likely to engage in an argument on topics where the fact of 
disagreement would be personally consequential. (Topics such as disagreements about 
music or sports are expected not to imply personal consequences.) 
 11. People are less likely to engage in an argument as part of a persuasion 
dialogue than an inquiry dialogue.  
 12. People are less likely to engage in an argument when the interlocutor has 
higher power and one’s position is weak or picayune. 
 13. People are less likely to engage in an argument in public than in private. 
Some of these more specific hypotheses are similar to those following from the first, 
more abstract, set of considerations. I think that all of them can be understood as 
particular manifestations of people’s anticipations about epistemology, costs and benefits, 
articulation, and socio-cultural matters. In fact, I believe that all of them can be 
subordinated to the general topic of costs and benefits.  
 In other words, my reading of Paglieri’s paper suggests that he has given us a 
three layered theory of argument engagement and escalation. The highest level concept is 
costs and benefits. These are subjectively understood and projected by the arguers. The 
ratio of costs to benefits should permit us to predict the decision to argue or not. A highly 
accurate theory requires not only that we have a fairly full description of potential 
rewards and punishments, but also that we know what alternative activities are available 
to the arguer. For instance, a person might well choose to participate in a punishing 
argument if the immediate alternative were an embarrassing conversation with someone 
else.  
 The theory’s second layer gives more detail to the ideas of costs and benefits. The 
chance of attaining one’s argumentative goals is a benefit, the effort involved in arguing 
is a cost, the prospect of escalation implies further costs, and social conventions 
automatically identify costs and benefits in various circumstances. 
 The last layer of considerations also details costs, benefits, and some factors that 
make them more or less likely, more or less valued. These include more specific elements 
contributing to the chances of success; prospects for personal harm to self, other, or the 
relationship between them; the likelihood of emotional reactions, positive or negative; 
and how the immediate social setting and norms affect everything else.  
 
3. CONCLUSION  
 
This particular appreciation of Paglieri’s ideas reforms them into a cost/benefit theory of 
both engagement and escalation. The very factors that make escalation more likely also 
make engagement less likely. By implication, his theory should also account for 
arguments that don’t escalate—those that resolve in the way we usually hope for—as 
well as decisions to participate. So we have four possible outcome events, organized as 
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alternatives at two points in time. First is the engage-avoid pair, and if the argument does 
take place, at its end we have predictions about escalate versus resolve. All four events 
are predicted by the same set of variables.  
 The theory has good prospects for empirical support. Cost-benefit theories appear 
with different terminology across the social sciences. Besides cost/benefit, we find 
terminology such as Subjective Expected Utility and Predicted Outcome Value. By and 
large, if a voluntary human decision can be pressed into a frame in which it makes sense 
to assess probability and value of outcome, the theory will find good empirical support 
when it predicts the decision or outcome (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen 1975, Lave & March 
1975, Marek et al. 2004, Thibaut & Kelley 1959, Uehara 1990).  
 Paglieri’s thinking offers an opportunity for advance in our understanding of 
argumentation. Escalation and unproductive arguments have been widely studied in the 
conflict management literature (e.g., Deutsch 1973, Folger et al. 2005), but as we know, 
not always from a perspective well informed by argument studies. The decision to engage 
in an argument appears from time to time in our argumentation and communication 
theories (e.g., Dillard 2004, Trapp & Hoff 1985). However, it is mainly theorized in the 
context of trait perspectives (e.g., Rancer & Avgis 2006), and therefore does not reach the 
precision and sensitivity of Paglieri’s thinking. Paglieri’s paper forms the basis for what 
could be a productive research program concerned with how people decide to argue, or 
not, and with whether their arguments are productive or destructive.  
 
          Link to paper 
 
REFERENCES  
 
Deutsch, M. (1973). The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and destructive processes. New Haven CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Dillard, J. P. (2004). The goals-plans-action model of interpersonal influence. In: J. S. Seiter and R. H. 
Gass (Eds.), Perspectives on Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining (pp. 185-
206). Boston MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Folger, J. P., M. S. Poole, and R. K. Stutman (2005). Working through Conflict: Strategies for 
relationships, groups, and organizations 5th ed. New York: Pearson. 
Lave, C. A. and J. G. March (1975). An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Marek, C. I., M. B. Wanzer, and J. L. Knapp (2004). An exploratory investigation of the relationship 
between roommates’ first impression and subsequent communication patterns. Communication 
Research Reports, 21, 210-220. 
Rancer, A. S. and T. A. Avtgis (2006). Argumentative and Aggressive Communication: Theory, research, 
and application. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 
Thibaut, J. W. and H. H. Kelley (1959). The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: John Wiley. 
Trapp, R. and N. Hoff (1985). A model of serial argument in interpersonal relationships. Journal of the 
American Forensic Association, 22, 1-11. 
Uehara, E. (1990). Dual exchange theory, social networks, and informal social support. American Journal 
of Sociology, 96, 521-557. 
 
 
 
